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THE CHICAGO TEAMSTERS' STRIKE—A STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

As a conspiracy against the industrial peace of the community, consummated by evil-minded labor leaders, the Chicago teamsters' strike would have comparatively little social significance, and the painful experiences of the few months past might be allowed to sink out of public consciousness without comment. As such the event has, in fact, been very generally characterized. The strike is declared to have been a conspiracy of wreckers for which trade union membership ought not to be held accountable. "Outside the compact body of officials," one is assured, "it has been rare to find any one who had any sympathy with it." The character assumed by these men as labor leaders is felt to be factitious and accidental; they have put on sheep's clothing, and worn it in the trade-union fold. Unionism is undefined.

Unfortunately all the evidence is unmistakably to the contrary. One need not assume that any but those union officials high in authority, and certain boon companions, knew the precise terms and details of this particular wrecking venture, but to presume ignorance of the general venality, which had for years characterized the operations of these men, is gratuitously naïve. Trade-union membership and organization in Chicago espoused this conspiracy with that same degree of unanimity and wholeheartedness with which it has taken up similar enterprises in the past. On this point the evidence is conclusive, and the ignoring of it is a striking instance of the disposition, so common at the present time, to extenuate the worst features of unionism. The teamsters' strike cannot be dismissed as a conspiracy of wreckers. The labor leaders were unquestionably and avowedly conspiring and single-minded in their motive to levy blackmail, but they were known to be such not only to their fellows in the organization, but to the whole community, in which their characters had been notoriously established for years. If their fellows were not perfectly well-informed, they were the only people in Chicago who

were ignorant in the matter. It is, therefore, not as a conspiracy of blackmailers, but as a modern instance of the working of democracy in the industrial field, that the Chicago teamsters' strike takes on ominous aspects.

In all that they did these conspiring leaders had the united power of unionism at their disposal. From day to day joint councils, executive boards, committees elected at regular sessions, meetings of delegates and officers, and mass meetings of members have acted upon every important question of policy, and have issued their mandates, which have been followed out literally. Committees appointed to negotiate have brought their terms before their fellows in special sessions, commonly to be repudiated. Referendums have been taken repeatedly; leaders have been deposed and reinstated at will; committees appointed and discharged, commended or reprimanded, according as their work proved acceptable or reprehensible to their fellows. At all times the power to act, to sanction or repudiate, has been freely exercised by trade-union membership. Indeed, from its very inception, the strike has had the sanction not only of the membership of that organization directly involved, but of organized labor throughout the community.¹ In striking, the teamsters were acting at least *pro forma*, upon an appeal which came to them from the Chicago Federation of Labor; that is to say, from that organization which, more than any other, officially represents organized labor in Chicago. The conduct of the strike was immediately intrusted to a committee of fifteen members, five representing the teamsters, five the Chicago Federation of Labor, and five the United Garment Workers.² Evidence on this point cumulated as the wrecking enterprise developed, and the trail of the serpent was uncovered and shown to be over all. The teamsters, by chance had an excellent opportunity of smiting the black monster,

¹ One may add also the sanction of that association which represents labor organizations throughout the country, the American Federation of Labor.

² During the progress of the strike a special strike committee of thirty-five members was appointed, including five delegates from each of the following organizations: the Building Material Trades Council, the Carpenters' Union, the Machinists' Union, the Associated Building Trades, the Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Garment Workers' Union, and the Federation of Labor.

of repudiating the conspiracy and the wreckers. This opportunity came in the occurrence of local elections of delegates to attend the national convention of the Brotherhood of Teamsters in Philadelphia. The most powerful teamsters' local in Chicago chose electors pledged to vote for the re-election of the arch wrecker.³ It is difficult to conceive how organized labor, as a body, could have set its seal of approval more unequivocally upon this record of blackmail and riot and venality. During its whole progress, and even after its most unholy disclosures, the enterprise has had the continuous and, except for intestinal dissensions, which have disrupted its organizations upon entirely selfish issues, the unanimous sanction of Chicago unionism.

It is the extreme democracy of unionism in Chicago which lends significance to this particular wrecking project. The events are the workings of industrial democracy, firmly and completely established in the community, more or less involving all local trade organizations. The strike is the supreme achievement of that democracy in one great trade, and it must be conceded that democracy has here uncovered an extremely menacing character, displaying venality and incompetency enthroned, blatant, and powerful to inflict injury.

Sir Henry Maine, writing upon popular government, in a passage wonderful for its evidence of intuitive judgment, observes that "popular government, especially as it approaches the democratic form, will tax to the utmost all the political sagacity and statesmanship of the world to keep it from misfortune." If this is true in the political field—and who can doubt the evidence here, which is found in the widespread misfortunes into which democracy has, in fact, fallen on every hand for the want of this sagacity and statesmanship—if true of our political organization, it is even truer of industrial democracy or trade unionism that it is today taxing to the utmost the qualities of union leadership and

³ Since writing the above the national election has taken place in Philadelphia, and Mr. Shea has been re-elected. On this occasion President Gompers of the American Federation of Labor vindicated Shea's personal character and his conduct of the strike. The charges against Shea were not denied, but rather made the occasion of boasting.

integrity. Certainly it is a matter of grave import to the workman that those qualities should be found wanting throughout whole ranges of the industrial field. Where they are wanting, unionism must disintegrate and miscarry—not, however, without working great injury in the community. In the industrial field, democracy has encountered great adversity and frequent failure, because the conditions of successful operation are far more exacting, and the demand for leadership and integrity more insistent than in the political field. Those misfortunes, which Maine regards as essentially imminent in all democracy, appear, in fact, during the last few years to have fallen heavily upon unionism. There is a striking parallelism, too, in the state of public opinion as regards unionism today, and that which Maine discovered to exist regarding democracy in general. Maine wrote:

Democracy is commonly described as having an inherent superiority over every form of government. It is supposed to advance with an irresistible and preordained movement. It is thought to be full of the promise of blessings to mankind; yet if it fails to bring with it these blessings, or even proves to be prolific of the heaviest calamities, it is not held to deserve condemnation.

This is exactly true of that great movement in the modern industrial world that is summed up in the phrase “industrial democracy” or trade unionism. An almost hypnotic state of mind in the community today enables it completely to disregard, or to misinterpret or extenuate the damaging record which trade unionism has been making for itself during the last few years. On the other hand, the whole progress of the working classes is quite unwarrantedly conceived, by those who are under this hypnotic spell, to be an achievement of this same democracy, an achievement conceived to be won at great pains, under an oppressive system of capitalism. And yet to one who surveys the facts of our industrial progress, free of hypnotic bias, this hardly won progress of the wage-earner, is largely an achievement of that capitalistic system itself which is the subject of such bitter arraignment, and the achievements of industrial democracy are, at least for whole great groups of American workingmen, exceedingly doubtful, uncertain, and insecure—obtained often at tre-

mendous cost. It is as a modern instance of that democracy that the Chicago teamsters' strike is especially deserving of consideration.

On the evening of April 6, some 200 teamsters in the employ of Montgomery Ward & Co. were ordered to stop work, and the strike was on. A joint committee of the teamsters' union and the Chicago Federation of Labor had waited upon a representative of the firm, Mr. R. J. Thorne, in the afternoon, and demanded reinstatement of 19 garment workers who had walked out in November, 1904. The places of these men had been filled long since, and reinstatement was refused. Mr. Thorne would not admit that there was a strike in his establishment. He pointed out that no one connected with the union had made any effort since December, 1904, to effect a settlement. At that time arbitration had been offered by his firm and refused by the garment workers. He would not now discharge, without cause, anyone in the firm's employ simply to make room for members of the union.

The teamsters' strike was therefore avowedly sympathetic, and, in the discussion of it, the issues of the earlier strike have been inextricably involved.

Briefly the facts of the garment workers' strike appear to have been as follows: They had been working under agreements which, with one exception, expired March 1, 1905. On October 29, 1904, the National Wholesale Tailors' Association notified the unions that, while they should observe strictly their existing agreements, during the unexpired contract period, they did not wish to renew contracts. In conference the employing tailors contended that they could not continue to do business in Chicago successfully under these contracts. After some further negotiating the employers were given twenty-four hours in which to sign a closed-shop agreement, to take effect March 1, 1905. An offer on their part to sign a blanket agreement with the national organization of garment workers, which should leave employers free to select workers from the entire trade union membership, was rejected by the garment workers, on the ground that it would enable employers to substitute cheap union labor for high-priced labor

in certain trades. Whereupon the employers declared that they should henceforth operate upon the open-shop basis. They appear to have had little difficulty in filling the places of those who went out on strike. "It is undoubtedly true," writes an officer of the garment workers, five months later, "that the shops are fairly well filled as to *numbers*. It is as little a matter of doubt that a very large majority of the 5,000 or 6,000 people who walked out more than five months ago are still out, and with apparently little prospect of immediate return to work." This at least explains the contention on the part of the employers that the strike was a dead issue at the time the teamsters came into it. So far as Montgomery Ward & Co. was concerned, it had never been a live issue of any consequence, and no considerable embarrassment had been at any time experienced by this firm. The garment workers' strike involved some twenty-eight employing establishments of the National Wholesale Tailors' Association in Chicago. The garment workers had from time to time, during the progress of their own strike, sought help of the teamsters, but the teamsters had refused to be drawn into the controversy. The motives which led the teamsters ultimately to take up the garment workers' strike were entirely foreign to the issues involved therein.

While the order to strike fell upon the community out of a clear sky—as industrial weather goes in Chicago—it was evidently the consummation of a long-considered, carefully devised scheme. The "labor commissioner," who has since achieved international notoriety for the system which he devised and worked successfully for negotiating blackmail, had beneficently given warning several weeks in advance of trouble brewing; being interpreted this meant that the teamsters' officials over in the "Kentucky Home" were getting somewhat down on their uppers. At this time the strike appears to have been, to speak professionally, a cheap affair, and word is said to have been passed to the employers that trouble might be avoided by the judicious use of \$2,000 or \$3,000. It is hardly credible, however, that immunity was ever offered at this price—it was decidedly worth more. To begin with, there were the garment workers, who were willing to pay something to the leaders to have the teamsters

“break in.” Then there were besides indefinite possibilities of levying blackmail upon the whole community of employers. In any event the offer, if it was ever made, was not snapped up at the proper moment, and the employers thus lost a golden opportunity. Their obtuseness in this instance must have occasioned considerable surprise among the conspirators. The price of peace soon went up to \$10,000, and ranged henceforth, when its real worth came to be fairly estimated, from \$10,000 to \$50,000.

At the very outset there appears to have been a settled conviction that the fight was to be a determined one between organized labor and employers in Chicago. The pretext of sympathy with the striking garment workers was a mere diplomatic convenience. Their interests were not at any time seriously considered by the teamsters. The garment workers themselves ultimately became convinced of this, and they accordingly proceeded to deliver what was described as a “body blow” to the teamsters’ strike by withdrawing from it altogether, and recalling their five representatives on the strike committee. Thus they entirely discredited the presumption of sympathy as a motive actuating the teamsters, who now went on with the strike on their own account.

Although the avowal of this motive had been all along on the face of it purely meretricious and insincere, the garment workers’ fight was, nevertheless, one well calculated to enlist sympathy on general principles. But the garment workers’ funds were sadly depleted as a consequence of their long struggle, and they had not the means, at this time, of inducing the teamsters to take up their cause in good faith. It was clearly a case for sympathy, however, which would undoubtedly have been extended if the garment workers had had the price. It may be observed further that their struggle had the appearance at this time of being a forlorn hope; and it is not at all likely that the teamsters, even if they had been honestly so-minded, could have converted defeat into anything but defeat more widespread and disastrous. The garment workers had made much the same fight in Rochester, Philadelphia and New York that they were now making in Chicago and been defeated. The Chicago employing tailors had asserted that they could not grant the union demands, and continue to do busi-

ness in competition with houses located outside Chicago, where union conditions no longer prevailed. Italian women in Chicago and non-union help, whose standards of comfort were comparatively low, and who were accustomed to working longer hours, had gradually taken the work away from the more highly paid Swedish and Norwegian girls, formerly employed under the closed shop. New methods of organization and work had come in which made possible the employment of cheaper labor. The closed-shop practice seemed to have broken down here, as in so many other instances, owing to the supply of unorganized labor, ready to undertake work given over by the strikers.

It is a noteworthy fact that both the garment workers' and the teamsters' organizations had been instrumental in effecting a considerable improvement in the conditions of labor and a substantial advance in wages in their respective trades, and that this was effected in both cases on the whole peaceably without arousing resentment in the community. This is a common experience of unionism. The community regards with satisfaction every rise in standard of living secured by organized labor, and its sympathy goes out, without price, to those who suffer any such depression of their standard as the garment workers appear to have experienced. In the garment workers' trade, the situation was summed up in the statement that the "union had the wage scale, and non-union workers had the work." They appear to have lost control of their trade.

Under ordinary circumstances, a strike of 200 men would hardly have received passing notice in the daily press. Indeed, at no time during the entire period of the strike has the number of men directly involved been very considerable, probably not exceeding a maximum of 5,000, and during the greater portion of the time not exceeding 2,000 or 3,000. But the strike order was in its way a challenge. It was, perhaps, the boldest blackmailing proposition that had ever been brought forward. In it there was seen the brutal menace of a general strike of 35,000 teamsters, and the complete paralysis of the city's commerce. This consequence must inevitably follow any determined effort on the part

of the merchants to break the teamsters' boycott on Montgomery Ward & Co., who had at this time contracts with some two hundred Chicago firms to deliver merchandise.

On the evening of the sixth, railway and express company managers assembled for conference at the Union League Club, determined upon general lines of policy to be immediately pursued in handling shipments to and from the Ward firm. It was determined to notify railway freight-handlers that they would be expected to handle freight from the strike-bound house, and that their contracts with the railroad companies would be considered void in case of refusal to obey orders. In fact, except for one instance of incipient trouble a few days later, which was adjusted without serious difficulty, the inside men at the freight houses were faithful in the observance of their agreements.

The express companies at the same time announced their determination to handle shipments to and from all firms of the National Wholesale Tailors' Association, including the boycotted Michigan Avenue mail-order house, and further, announced their determination to discharge all men who refused to make or receive deliveries as ordered.

Meantime, the Express Drivers' Union, having called a special meeting, announced that its members would "attempt" to make deliveries as ordered, but should they be threatened by pickets, they should turn back with their loads to the freight-houses. The chance that they might approach the boycotted house unmolested by union pickets, detailed for this express purpose, was so infinitesimally small that this policy of attempting to make deliveries was not felt to be in the least compromising.

After this manner, a campaign was fairly planned out on the evening of the sixth of April, and on the following morning the war was on. The express companies undertook to carry out their announced policy of making deliveries regardless of the union boycott: men who refused to obey orders were summarily discharged. The temper of the express companies may be inferred from the following statement by one of the general managers:

The men have declared a boycott upon one of our best customers. We have discharged all the men who refused to make deliveries to Montgomery

Ward & Co., and shall continue along that line if we have to discharge every man in our employ.

We have a contract with our men which expires June 24, and unless something unforeseen happens we will never make another contract. The men have no grievance that is apparent to us, and if they all go out in a body, we will meet the issue, as we are always prepared for just such an emergency.

Immediately upon the issue of the strike order, a final effort had been made to adjust the garment workers' strike. An attorney, representing the employing tailors and the Ward firm, in conference with a special committee, representing the teamsters, the garment workers, and the Chicago Federation of Labor, offered on behalf of his clients to reinstate the striking tailors within ten days, and the cutters and other workers as soon as places could be found for them. This settlement was rejected by the joint committee because it did not provide for recognition of the union, the reinstatement of the men being on their application as individuals.

On the first day of the strike three loaded trucks were moved through the streets, under heavy police guard, from the strike-bound house to the several railroad stations. The cry of "Scab, quit your job! Be a man!" was raised, and the long list of arrests for disorder and riot began. Each day from this time on, however, the number of trucks moved by the Ward firm, in defiance of the union embargo, increased, and a nearer approach was made to normal business.

Just what the fight was all about was not, in the beginning, very clear to any but the contestants, although blackmail was assumed as a matter of course. Employers declared the strike to be without an issue, and this was practically conceded by the teamsters, who did not pretend to have any grievances of their own, but contented themselves with denying that anything in their contracts prevented them from joining in a sympathetic strike. However, a special committee of fifteen, appointed by the Chicago Federation of Labor and the teamsters to wait upon the newly-elected Mayor Dunne, and to confer with a committee of the Commercial Exchange, declined the offer to arbitrate their right, under their contracts, to enter into a sympathetic strike,

basing their refusal upon the thesis that sympathetic striking was an unimpeachable union principle. While insisting upon the right to boycott and to strike sympathetically, President Shea, nevertheless, at this time declared that the boycott would not be extended to other firms than the one which had been singled out for attack, although no explanation whatever was given why this particular firm had been singled out rather than another. The probable explanation is that the large teaming interests involved here made the prospects of graft so alluring as completely to demoralize the teamsters. Still any other of several big firms might have been selected with almost equal prospects of profits, and were, indeed, quite likely to be dealt with by turn later on. It was this prospect, together with their experiences of the several years past, that aroused employers to united resistance.

Union officials were now disposing their forces to look after non-union drivers, who were being brought in to take the places of men on strike. Hotel managers were ordered summarily to expel non-union men, which they immediately proceeded to do. Cafés were threatened with boycott in case they served non-union men with food; wherever the orders of the strike leaders were disregarded, pickets were stationed to dissuade patrons, turn back wagons, and cut off supplies. Special quarters, were however, soon provided for housing and victualizing non-union drivers, and this source of annoyance removed. Personal baggage could not be moved from the railroad stations, and freight began to accumulate in the yards. The express companies and the merchants, of course, protested vigorously against this policy, as a violation of agreements under which their men were working.

After two days of warring in the streets, organized labor in Chicago devoted Sunday, April 9, to mass-meeting demonstrations of loyalty to unionism in general, and in particular, to the teamsters, who were conducting a glorious campaign in defense of all that unionism stood for. Unionism was outraged that the merchants of the city should pretend to move their wagons through the streets in defiance of the union embargo, and especially outraged that the city should protect them in doing this. The Chicago Federation of Labor had issued a call for a gen-

eral meeting in Bricklayers' Hall of the officials of all locals in the city, whether affiliated with the Federation or not. This meeting was addressed by President Shea, the hero of the occasion, and other leaders. Thirty locals of the teamsters' brotherhood held special sessions and voted unanimously to support the Chicago federation. A meeting of the railway express drivers, reported as the largest meeting ever held by that organization, 831 members attending, also voted to support their leaders, and their business agent declared that "no man connected with the Railway Express Drivers' Union would haul anything to or from Montgomery Ward & Co., until the conclusion of the strike." The van, truck, and parcel delivery wagon teamsters, in the meetings of their respective organizations, manifested equal enthusiasm, "cheer after cheer rending the air in response to appeals of their leaders." Democracy ran riot, and the blackmailing "conspiracy of wreckers" was glorified into a crusade of unionism.

Pledges of money were freely made by Chicago locals, and during the strike similar pledges poured in upon the teamsters from other sections of the country. The New York locals were reported later on as having pledged five cents a day per member, or approximately \$1,900 a day. In other cities, the teamsters' locals contributed according to their resources. Financial reports of the forty-odd teamsters' locals in Chicago were declared to show a total balance of cash on deposit at the banks of over \$500,000. Chicago local unions in other trades were announced to have guaranteed \$10,000 a week, while the strike was on. These figures are significant only as evidence of the wholesouled interest which organized labor felt in the enterprise on foot. Although the actual amount of money paid over cannot be accurately determined, it is not unlikely that the pledges were made in good faith; the significant thing, however, is the spirit in which they were given.

On the day following, the merchants mildly protested, in the following pronunciamiento:

Whereas, the employers of Chicago have through a committee met representatives of the teamsters' unions to present to them the necessity of their

keeping their contracts and, not being able to induce them to live up to said contracts: be it

Resolved, at a meeting of merchants and manufacturers called for the purpose of considering this question, that after investigation it appears to us that any difference between Montgomery Ward & Co., or any other concern and their employes, should not prompt the teamsters of Chicago to attempt to paralyze the whole mercantile interests of this city; and be it further

Resolved, that the various interests involved insist that their business be allowed to continue in a lawful and peaceable manner and all necessary steps be taken to this end and that under no circumstances can we allow any body of men to interfere with carrying on our valid interests and legitimate business.

So, in the first few days the issues were clearly defined: the number of men out on strike was absurdly disproportionate to the menace of widespread industrial paralysis; there was no question of wages, or hours, or conditions of labor; the teamsters preferred no grievance on their own account, or on that of any other group of workers in the community; it was not a question of securing reinstatement of nineteen tailors. At no time have the employers interested themselves in the cause of the trouble at the Ward establishment. The merchants, manufacturers, and express companies were fighting the teamsters on an entirely independent issue; namely, the right of the union to draw its cordon of pickets around an industrial establishment, and to declare a boycott for any cause whatever. In so far as one may assume any sincere motive other than that of levying blackmail upon the business community in general, and incidentally upon a humble fraternal order of garment workers, it is to be found in the determination to establish this right to boycott as a union principle. As if to emphasize this single issue and establish the principle of unionism unmistakably, the teamsters seem to have sought an occasion for declaring a boycott which was confessedly trivial and trumped up. The fight was made to determine the power of an irresponsible organization to put an embargo upon the city's commerce, incidentally involving violation of contracts for all concerned — for the teamsters, who were working under agreements not to engage in sympathetic strikes, and for the merchants, manufacturers, and teaming companies, who were under obligations to deliver merchandise. On this point the criminal code of the state

appears quite unambiguous in declaring such action to be criminal conspiracy.⁴

With the issues so defined, Mayor Dunne who had assumed the duties of his office two days before the warring began—an incident which is fairly or unfairly regarded as being full of significance by those disposed to read politics into the strike—and the State Board of Arbitration became active in seeking an adjustment through arbitration. The newly invested mayor was indefatigable during these first days in his efforts to negotiate peace. He was constantly in communication and conference with agents, officials, and committees of the warring factions. But the case for quite obvious reasons did not admit of arbitration. This was equally true whether one regarded the strike as a simple blackmailing enterprise, or as an honest effort to establish the power of the union to boycott in accordance with the newly declared “principle” of unionism. Under the circumstances, the effort to induce arbitration, though persistently renewed, was bound to fail. Employers were not willing to submit to arbitration their “right to do business” and to use the streets. Obviously, it was not a question of respective rights at all but of powers. The power of the union could not be determined by arbitration, but only by fighting; no one really questioned the abstract right of the merchants to do business and to use the streets of Chicago. At one of the early conferences with the mayor, indeed, this right was expressly championed by President Dold of the Chicago

⁴ The criminal code under which indictments were subsequently made, reads as follows:

“If any two or more persons conspire or agree together or the officers or executive committee of any society or organization or corporation shall issue or utter any circular or edict as the action of or the instruction to its members or any other persons, societies, organizations or corporations for the purpose of establishing a so-called boycott or blacklist or shall post or distribute any written or printed notice in any places with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the person, character, business or employment or property of another or to obtain money or other property by false pretenses or do any illegal act injurious to the public trade, health, police or administration of public justice, shall be deemed guilty of conspiracy, and every such offender, whether as individuals or as the officers of any society or organization, and every person convicted of conspiracy at common law, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding five years or fined not exceeding \$2,000 or both.”

Federation of Labor, and other labor leaders. Dold's statement to the mayor was as follows :

We are here to ask you, as mayor of Chicago, that the streets of Chicago be kept open to the public. We believe that the streets belong to the people and not to Montgomery Ward & Co. Yet they have been given the preference. We teamsters do not want to have to get out of the way to make room for Montgomery Ward & Co.'s wagons. We do not believe that it is right that the police should be used to make us stand round for any corporation.

"We teamsters have a certain amount of work to do," broke in Mr. Shea, "and we cannot do that work if we are to be pushed about by the police." Just what this "certain amount of work" was, which Mr. Shea had in mind for the teamsters to do, may be inferred from the subsequent record of rioting and brutal assault which marked the progress of the strike. It may be observed in passing that the "people" who had occasion to use their own streets were expected to get a permit from the president of the teamsters' brotherhood. One of the banks in the city secured such a permit, authorizing it to call at the Ward building for deposits. "It strikes us," remarked one employer, "that this permit is more powerful in its results than a like order issued by the Chief of Police might be." The question was clearly not one of right but of power to exercise a right, and that question could not be arbitrated.

Mayor Dunne's statement to the executive committee of the Employers' Association at this time, that the union leaders were willing to arbitrate, must, therefore, be qualified. They were avowedly willing to arbitrate the question of reinstating the nineteen striking garment workers. This, as they very well knew, was precisely the question which Montgomery Ward & Co. were not willing to arbitrate, for reasons already indicated, of which the chief was that the firm would not dismiss men without cause, who had been in their employ for several months. The union on its side, was not willing to submit to arbitration the "union principle" of sympathetic striking and boycotting. The employers were willing to submit their contracts to the mayor for interpretation as regarded the declaration of a sympathetic strike, but were not willing to arbitrate their right to use the streets. Later on

(April 21) the union leaders, who began to feel their control of the situation weakening, offered to submit the whole controversy for adjudication to Judge Tuley. This proposition at the time when it was made was not for various reasons acceptable to the employers.

In their efforts to lift the union boycott, the merchants were seriously embarrassed by the fact that the teaming in the city is largely contracted out to independent associations of team owners. Much, therefore, depended upon the attitude of these associations. It very early developed that they were generally disposed to follow a policy which they characterized as "neutral;" that is to say, the policy of not forcing deliveries to the boycotted firm: thus they hoped to avoid being drawn into the controversy. Such a policy, however expedient, could not properly be regarded as in fact neutral, since it conceded to the unions all that they demanded, and recognized their right to put an embargo upon trade.

The embarrassment of the big teaming companies, who had all signed "iron-clad closed-shop" agreements with their teamsters, is, nevertheless, easily understood. Should they undertake to make deliveries, they would certainly be drawn into the controversy, and probably forced to suspend general service to all customers, at least temporarily. In a letter sent out, at this time, to patrons by one company, before attempting deliveries of coal at the Ward building, the following paragraph occurs:

Dear Sir: — We have a contract to deliver coal to the firm of Montgomery Ward & Co. It is our interest to see that they have coal sufficient for their needs. If we should have serious trouble in doing this, it undoubtedly would hamper us and perhaps result in the partial or total suspension of deliveries on our contracts. . . . We should regret exceedingly our inability to deliver coal whenever and however you may order.

This particular company later on sold out its whole equipment of teams and wagons to the Employers' Teaming Company, the organization of which is the next important development of the strike to be considered.

The so-called neutral policy of the big teaming companies forced the merchants to organize an independent company to take

over this service, and the Employers' Teaming Company, with a capital of \$100,000—later on increased to \$1,000,000—was accordingly incorporated under the laws of West Virginia, application for incorporation being filed April 15. As a foreign corporation this company operated in Illinois under protection of the federal courts. Announcement of this move on the part of employers, one week after the beginning of the strike, was received with considerable incredulity, but any doubts as to the determination of employers to take over the teaming service were speedily dispelled. The newly organized company immediately proceeded to buy outright wagons and teams, which were manned by non-union drivers and placed at the disposal of the merchants.

Another effort was made, at this time, to settle the garment workers' strike. The garment workers stood ready to concede every point, and to go back upon an open-shop basis, provided the employers would agree to reinstate those out on strike within a certain time. The employing tailors would not, however, undertake reinstatement within the time limit set. Mayor Dunne, in his effort to negotiate peace, secured the following proffer of terms from the employers, which were rejected as affording an insufficient guarantee of reinstatement:

The National Wholesale Tailors' Association . . . will, in the filling of vacant positions, re-employ as fast as possible, consistent with the demands and requirements of their business the former employes now on strike, equally with other applicants, both as to employment, wages, and hours.

After two weeks of hard fighting, and of more or less meretricious parleying and conference, in and out of the mayor's office, an injunction was secured in the state court, from Judge Brentano, restraining all interference with the business of Montgomery Ward & Co. In this injunction the defendants named are members and officers of the teamsters' locals (Nos. 725, 720, 705, and 704), and of the garment workers' unions, officials of the Chicago Federation of Labor, and members of the special strike committee appointed by the Federation. Judge Brentano required a \$5,000 bond to insure strikers against possible injustice from the injunction. Some seven hundred writs were immediately served

upon union members and officers named as defendants. The effect in suppressing violence was immediately apparent, and the backbone of the strike appeared for the moment to be weakened.

So far the union leaders had shown no disposition to extend the strike or the boycott. On the contrary, President Shea had declared repeatedly that he did not propose to play into the hands of employers by so extending it. The employers were, however, forcing the issue, and, on the 20th of April, a committee was appointed by the Teamsters' Joint Council⁵ to wait upon certain State-street stores, and demand the discharge of non-union men employed by them in making deliveries to Montgomery Ward & Co. This employment of non-union men was declared, by the teamsters, to be "discrimination" against the union men employed in making general deliveries to patrons, and the committee was instructed to demand that all deliveries to Montgomery Ward & Co. should cease.

The policy of employing non-union men to make deliveries to the strike-bound house on Michigan Avenue had been adopted by the merchants in the hope of avoiding conflict with the unions. In a letter issued to their teamsters, April 24, by several State-street merchant houses, the following statement of their policy is made:

We have been endeavoring to fulfill our contracts with the above-named company (Montgomery Ward & Co.) without drawing you into the conflict. We trust that you appreciate this fact. It will be our policy to continue to deliver merchandise as is usual with us in the regular course of our business, to any customer with whom we have dealings, and we desire to ask the drivers in our employ not to interfere with such deliveries. If you should be asked to leave your places, we hope you will not do so without consulting us, either as a body or as individuals.

⁵ The conduct of the strike was largely in the hands of the Teamsters' Joint Council, a body of delegates elected by the Chicago locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. At its regular weekly meetings in times of peace, the council determines upon all important questions of local policy. During the recent strike it met frequently, often from day to day to determine upon the conduct of the strike. The several locals vary greatly in membership, ranging from approximately 8,000 in the truck teamsters' local down to small organizations of less than a hundred members. In the joint council, however, each local, whatever its membership, has equal representation.

It is further pointed out, in this letter, that a contract with Teamsters' Local No. 715 (department-store drivers) expressly stipulates that there shall be no sympathetic strikes. This clause reads as follows:

It is agreed that no driver in any of our stables shall go upon any sympathetic strike individually or as a member of any organization according to the rules laid down by the parent organization.

Upon the day following the appointment of the special committee to demand cessation of deliveries by the State-street houses, a meeting was called of the business agents of all locals to confer with President Shea. At this meeting it is reported, and upon other occasions as well, it was suggested that the only hope for the strikers lay in "spreading the strike to such an extent that the police could not handle it," and whether or not with this motive it was now announced that the Teamsters' Joint Council and the National Executive Board of the Teamsters' Union had at last determined upon the policy of spreading the strike. This policy was accordingly immediately put into practice, and the first extension came on April 22, in a strike of coal teamsters, in employ of the Westfall Teaming Co., contract deliverers for the E. M. Daniels Coal Co. These teamsters, thirty-five in number, were ordered by the union steward in the Westfall barns, to quit work when a non-union teamster called at the South Water street docks for a load of coal to be delivered to Montgomery Ward & Co.; the steward in ordering the men to quit work was acting in accordance with official instructions.

On April 23, the garment workers withdrew their representatives from the strike committee, and abandoned the strike against Montgomery Ward & Co. They charged that the teamsters had been acting from ulterior selfish motives, and not out of sympathy with them. They had been demanding that the attack should be directed against some of the big wholesale tailoring firms. This request had been completely ignored by the teamsters.

Two days later, April 25, a noon meeting at the Auditorium Hotel of several hundred employers, members of the Employers Association, passed unanimously the following resolution, a copy of which was sent to President Shea:

Our drivers will be expected to deliver merchandise during regular hours to any place in the city that we may direct. If they refuse to do so, we shall be obliged to fill their places with drivers who will make such deliveries. We think it only fair to inform them of this in advance.

The managers of the several express companies passed a similar resolution with the further declaration that men discharged for disobeying orders would never be re-employed.

At this time the employers were determined to make no concessions. They refused, according to a later statement by Shea, to reinstate twelve men, as a condition of settlement. "We were told plainly," declared Shea, "that our men must return to work as individuals, and that they would employ whomsoever they saw fit." An offer by the Montgomery Ward & Co. to "re-employ their former teamsters without discrimination whenever positions should be open, except those who had recently created disturbances," was indignantly rejected. "If this is their attitude," exclaimed Shea, "it means a fight." On the day following, April 26, the strike was extended to several big wholesale houses, some five hundred drivers quitting work,⁶ and on April 27 the railway express wagon drivers, numbering about 1,000, were ordered out by their leaders, when directed to make deliveries to strike-bound houses. Some men are reported to have torn up their union cards when ordered out, but the order to strike was pretty generally obeyed.

Meantime, the Employers' Teaming Co. was placing at the service of the merchants a considerable number of teams and wagons, purchased wherever they could be secured.

⁶ The method of extending the strike is thus described in the daily press: "A union driver of Farwell's, ordered to deliver a load to Montgomery Ward & Co., refused. In ten minutes every teamster in employ of Farwell & Co. laid down his reins and walked out. An hour later, the wholesale drivers of Marshall Field & Co., and of Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. walked out. John Tuohy, a union driver employed by A. M. Forbes Co., wholesale grocers, was ordered to drive a wagonload of merchandise from the warehouse of Sprague, Warner & Co.'s to Montgomery Ward's main store, refused, and at once was notified that he no longer was wanted. Two negroes took the wagon to its destination under police protection, and 180 employees of the Forbes Company decided to strike. At The Fair, the teamsters walked out when one man refused to deliver goods. At the Boston Store, the order to strike was anticipated and seventy-five teamsters discharged.

The garment workers, again in conference with the agent of their old employers, the wholesale tailors, were now informed that the only condition of settlement was unconditional surrender, and they, therefore, continued the fight, independently of the teamsters.

No direct appeal had yet been made for interference by the federal authorities, although some pressure had been brought to bear upon the mayor to call in the state militia. The necessity for any outside intervention was not generally conceded. It was felt that the situation was one with which local authorities ought to deal. At this time, however, the United States Express Company advised the acting secretary of the treasury that the company could not be responsible for the safe carriage of money through the streets, between railroad stations and the sub-treasury unless they could depend upon federal protection; and the post commander at Fort Sheridan was instructed by the secretary of war to extend such aid as might be needed to protect government property. Upon hearing of this move President Shea sent the following telegram to Secretary Taft and to the post commander:

The International Brotherhood of Teamsters will furnish union drivers with or without compensation for all wagons doing government business. They will obey any orders issued by any contractor for the United States government.

This impertinence on the part of Shea appears to have occasioned little comment. In fact, no necessity for calling on the troops developed, in the service of the federal government, although violence continued to mark the spread of the strike.

A crisis was evidently approaching. On the 28th of April, the Employers' Teaming Co. secured a federal injunction, and, on the same day, the express companies applied for a similar restraining order, which they secured.⁷ "Violence at once subsided," observes

⁷ The character of these injunctions may be judged from the following synopsis of the text of Judge Kohlsaat's restraining order, granted the Employers' Teaming Co. *vs.* Teamsters' Joint Council *et al.*:

The defendants, as in the case of the injunctinal order previously issued by the state court, are officers and members of the Teamsters' Joint Council and Locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (after service of the writ upon the secretary, president, or business agent of these organizations), and some

one writer, "and the teamsters were beaten."⁸ But although the salutary effect of the restraining orders was quite apparent, this conclusion appears in the light of subsequent events altogether premature.

Eleven State-street department stores were now forced to suspend retail deliveries altogether. The lumber-wagon drivers and the building-material drivers shut off deliveries to these houses, several of which happened at this time to be engaged in extensive building operations. The hay-and-feed drivers threatened to shut off supplies at the barns where non-union help was employed, and the Union Traction Company, employees threat-

forty-odd persons cited by name. These are enjoined "to desist and refrain from in any manner interfering with . . . any business of the complainant, the Employers' Teaming Co., and from interfering with complainants' agents, or any person seeking employment with or seeking to do business with said complainant, or going to or from the houses, teams, wagons, stables or barns used. . . . Also, from standing or gathering near or about . . . for the purpose or in such a manner as to interfere . . . And, also, from gathering or standing or passing along and about any of the streets or public places in said city for the purpose or in such manner as to interfere . . . And, also, from accompanying, following, talking with or calling upon any person or persons employed by or doing business with said complainants against the will of said person or persons, for the purpose of or in such manner as to intimidate, threaten or coerce . . . And, also, from compelling or inducing . . . by threats . . . any of the employees . . . to refuse or fail to perform their work . . . And, also, from preventing any person . . . by threats . . . from freely seeking or entering into or continuing in said complainants' service . . . And, also, from compelling or inducing . . . said complainants by threats . . . to employ or discharge or to refrain from employing or discharging any person . . . And, also, from either singly or in combination with others from picketing, besetting or patrolling any place or places where said complainants' employees, teams, etc. . . . happen to be . . . with the purpose or in such manner as to intimidate, threaten, etc. . . . any of the employees . . . or any person . . . seeking employment . . . And, from interfering in like manner with any such person . . . anywhere in said city because of such person . . . being in the employ of said complainant or of seeking to be employed . . . or because such person . . . failed or refused to join in the teamsters' strike. . . . And, also, from doing, aiding or abetting any acts whatsoever in the furtherance of any conspiracy or combination to restrain or obstruct said complainant, its officers, etc. . . . in the free . . . operation of complainants' business"

Seven hundred and fifty copies of the writ were given to the marshal for service.

⁸ Luke Grant, "Rights and Wrongs of the Chicago Strike," *Public Opinion*, June 10, 1905.

ened to join the strike because of non-union coal delivered at the power houses. This delivery had been made as follows: Drivers of the Peabody Coal Co., contractors to deliver coal to the Union Traction Co., had all struck, and the Employers' Teaming Co. had forced the delivery under heavy police guard of five loads, thus arousing general indignation among the street-car men. They, however, being under agreements not to strike, ultimately refused to be drawn into the controversy. At no time during the entire period of the strike did it assume a more menacing aspect than on these last days of April. The complete paralysis of trade seemed imminent.

Counteracting influences were, however, in evidence. President Rau, of the Allied Building Trades Council, declared that these trades would not participate in a sympathetic strike. "We have contracts with our employers," he said, "and are not going to break them by entering into a fight for the glorification of the teamsters," and the president of the Building Material Trades Council made a similar statement with reference to his organization. However, some 300 carpenters, plumbers, and electrical workers, employed in the construction of two additional stories to The Fair building, found occasion to walk out at this opportune time, owing to the employment of several non-union men among the regular employees of the firm. Manager Kesner of the firm stated that, in his opinion, the union men "were simply looking for a chance to quit work, and made this non-union matter an excuse for laying aside their tools." Whereupon the union teamsters refused to deliver building material to the store. The union men explained that "non-union men were attempting to work in close association with the union men, and that such a condition was intolerable." The president of the Lumbermen's Association (employers), in reply to Shea's request that they should not order deliveries to strike-bound houses, stated that contracts must be fulfilled. Every effort was, however, made to avoid involving the team owners in a general strike, and in most cases deliveries were not forced to houses under the teamsters' ban.

Saturday, the 29th of April, was full of events: the packers determined to carry out their contracts to deliver meat to boy-

cotted houses, and President Golden of the Stock Yards teamsters, received orders to strike his 1,200 drivers, whenever the order to make these deliveries should be given. The wholesale grocers and commission merchants also determined to make deliveries, thus threatening to involve some 900 additional teamsters. Three hundred and fifty department-store bundle boys were called out, and 150 drivers' helpers. The boycott was extended to include several new houses besides the State-street stores, four wholesale grocery houses, and several coal companies. Extension of the strike to the lumber and ice wagon drivers was avoided by the companies not ordering deliveries to boycotted houses. The Employers' Teaming Co. increased its capital to \$1,000,000, to enable it to take up the teaming business on a larger scale. The mayor issued a proclamation warning people from following wagons "upon which were seated men armed with deadly weapons, claiming to be acting within their legal rights." Twelve strike leaders were indicted before the Grand Jury, on evidence furnished by the employers, "for conspiracy to ruin the business of Montgomery Ward & Co." Several men were shot, one killed, and the day is described as the "worst day for the police since the strike began." The mayor and a committee of citizens including Judge Tuley and Miss Jane Addams made an appeal for peace, and for the declaration of an armistice of forty-eight hours. Negroes were reported firing into crowds wildly and using razors (hickory canes were substituted for fire-arms later), and in one place strikers strung live wires, endangering the lives of non-union men. The needed touch of irony is added by President Shea's proclamation to all union teamsters, "to refrain from any act which will be a violation of the law or can be construed as a violation of either injunction issued." He pointed out that employers were arming strike-breakers for the express purpose of inciting violence.

Meantime, the Employers' Teaming Co. continued to increase its working force and equipment, leasing department-store and other wagons which could not be bought, and renting buildings in which to house its men. It was reported to have 2,000 teams in

service, and it undertook to provide firms operating their own teams with non-union drivers.

During the next few days, rioting and violence appeared to be on the increase, and on May 4, a delegation of employers waited upon Governor Deneen to ask for troops. The governor replied that he would send troops when requested to do so by the local authorities. Much pressure was brought to bear upon Mayor Dunne, who, however, maintained that the local authorities still had the situation in hand, and were able to afford all protection needed. By way of increasing the efficiency of the police, they were permitted to ride upon wagons which they were guarding. The employers, however, still protested that the police protection afforded by the city was, as it had been from the beginning, altogether inadequate, and they, therefore, appealed to the county sheriff, who began to swear in special deputies. Selected employees (drivers) of firms against which the strike was directed were thus sworn in to serve as deputies without pay. This proved to be very effective in inducing a semblance of order. Moreover, by way of quieting the demand for troops, which was becoming quite general, word appears to have been passed out to the teamsters from their headquarters to refrain from violence for the time being, until after President Roosevelt's visit. The community enjoyed a short respite. Employers, perhaps out of deference to public sentiment, began to substitute white drivers for the negro strike-breakers originally brought into the city, and thus one cause of irritation was removed. The call for troops was not issued.

On May 10, a committee of trades-union officials, headed by President Shea, presented their manifesto to President Roosevelt, a chance guest in the city, and received from him well-merited, crushing rebuke. President Roosevelt's remarks upon this occasion have been widely published, but cannot be omitted from any account of the strike. They were largely instrumental in checking insolence and in strengthening local authority in its hitherto somewhat infirm determination to re-establish law and order. To the strike leaders, in reply to their request that he should not interfere on threat of violence, the President replied in part as follows :

I have not been called upon to interfere in any way, but you must not misunderstand my attitude. In every effort of Mayor Dunne to prevent violence by mobs or individuals, to see that the laws are obeyed and that order is preserved, he has the hearty support of the President of the United States — and, in my judgment, he should have that of every good citizen of the United States. . . . I am a believer in unions. I am an honorary member of one union. But the union must obey the law, just as the corporation must obey the law; just as every man rich or poor must obey the law. As yet no action whatever has been called for by me, and most certainly if action is called for by me I shall try to do exact justice under the law to every man so far as I have power. But the first essential is the preservation of law and order, the suppression of violence by mobs or individuals.

Later, at the Iroquois Club, the President added :

This government is not and never shall be the government of a plutocracy. This government is not and never shall be the government of a mob.

But if ever the need arises, back of the city stands the State, and back of the State stands the Nation.

Early in May the mayor appointed a commission of three citizens to investigate the causes of the strike. This commission was unable, or unwilling to act. Neither employers nor labor leaders would recognize it. The query has since been raised why the mayor did not at this time call in the State Board of Arbitration, which has power to compel witnesses. It is not at all likely, however, that the State Board could at this time, or at any time previous, have effected any adjustment. After some preliminary investigation the mayor's commission suspended activities altogether, making no public report.

Between four and five thousand men were now out on strike. The mayor had finally declared to the union leaders, in unambiguous terms, his intention of calling for troops should rioting and violence continue. Cab drivers were forced to take passengers to boycotted houses on penalty of having their licenses revoked. The teamsters, who had at no time received the support of public opinion, were now evidently fast losing their grip. President Gompers, who had been summoned to the city, is said to have advised peace, and an agreement to settle the strike was, in fact, nearly effected, on May 20, between the Employers' Association and the teamsters, on the following terms: That men on strike

be taken back as vacancies occurred; that no man hired during the strike be discharged to create a vacancy; that the Employers' Teaming Co. remain non-union; that the strike be called off immediately, all violence cease, and police and deputy sheriffs be withdrawn. This settlement, negotiated by a committee of the teamsters, was blocked in the Joint Council. In case the strike against the associated merchants and manufacturers were called off, the council now insisted upon continuing a boycott against the express companies which had all along operated independently of the Employers' Association, and firmly adhered to their original policy of refusing to re-employ a single man who had gone out on strike. The companies, quite properly, denied the charge of blacklisting brought against them, for pursuing this policy. One company, it was explained, was not debarred from employing men who had been in the employ of another company and had joined the strike, but only from re-employment of men who had been in its own employ. There was no blacklisting of men from company to company.

With some intermittent threatening that they were going to undertake deliveries to boycotted firms, the team-owning associations continued their policy of "neutrality," no concerted effort to make the deliveries, however, being made. It is not unlikely that a cheaper way of operating had been found, and that the strike leaders sold to certain team-owners the right to make these deliveries with non-union men and unmarked wagons. The price put upon this privilege is said to have been \$5,000; undoubtedly the price was somewhat depressed owing to the fact that the union did not absolutely control the situation at this time.

Meantime, an extraordinary outcome of parleying in the mayor's office was reached in a determination to take a referendum of the truck drivers' local on the question of abiding by agreements to arbitrate. During the month of May the team owners had brought to bear upon the teamsters some pressure to make deliveries to strike-bound houses; but little had been effected in the way of raising the teamsters' ban. On June 4 representatives of the team owners and of the teamsters in conference with Mayor Dunne agreed that should the truck drivers vote to abide

by contracts with employers, the question of making deliveries to boycotted houses should then be submitted to arbitration. Three days before this the team-owning associations had rather ostentatiously, given the truck drivers five days in which to decide by such a referendum that they would submit this question to arbitration. At this time, the teamsters were quite obviously out of the running so far as winning the strike was concerned, which may account for the show of courage on the part of the team owners. Nevertheless, when the truck drivers voted not to arbitrate, the associated team owners made no concerted effort to resume service. The delicate task of making deliveries to the boycotted houses appears by common consent to have devolved upon the Employers' Teaming Co., organized for that express purpose, and, if rumor may be credited, upon those who bought and paid for the privilege, which, of course, the labor leaders had up for sale in their regular way of business.

Repeated efforts were now made to break up the employers' organization by effecting settlements with individual employers. Committees were appointed to wait upon several merchants and manufacturers, and numerous conferences were held. Employers without exception refused to negotiate independently, referred all committees to their association, and insisted that settlement be arranged through their executive board. In a word, they were now holding out for recognition by the teamsters of the employers' union.

The teamsters were becoming anxious to end the strike against the merchants upon any terms which gave fair assurance of re-employment. As the express companies were still uncompromising in their refusal to take back men, against them, it was felt, the fight must be continued. Moreover, the union insisted that the boycott must be maintained against these companies until the strike against them should be called off. On this issue, settlement with the merchants was again blocked. This right to boycott was in fact the real issue upon which the whole fight had been made from the beginning, and the employers, with victory in sight, were now more than ever determined not to yield a point. In negotiation for settlement it further developed that the teamsters

were sensitive in the matter of maintaining police guard of non-union drivers after calling off the strike. This the teamsters appeared to regard as a reflection upon them, and they made it a point of honor, that non-union men should not be protected; all guards must be immediately withdrawn. To this demand the employers had, indeed, at one time acceded, but they now, to the great astonishment of union leaders, declared their intention of not immediately delivering non-union drivers over into the hands of the teamsters. Through their committee they replied that they would not be a party to creating a situation under which the non-union drivers would be subjected to physical violence and intimidation, and, therefore, such protection should continue for the benefit of the non-union drivers, but only so long as there was violence or real danger of violence.

The teamsters were highly indignant at this uncompromising attitude of their old employers, and repudiated all suggestions of settlement upon such dishonorable terms. On the whole, perhaps no other phase of the controversy is so significant as the effrontery displayed by the labor leaders in thus openly demanding what was virtually a free license to slug non-union drivers out of town. The community, accustomed to common practice in this respect, entertained the suggestion complacently enough; that the employers should not accede to the request, as is commonly done in such cases by way of conferring the usual honors of war upon the defeated, appeared indeed extraordinary. The strike was "all over but rioting;" the union had lost out on every count, and the only question regarded the union's privilege to create vacancies in the usual way.

It is necessary now to take up briefly some of the evidence bearing upon the origin and motives of the strike, elicited by testimony before the Grand Jury.

Driscoll, according to his own rough estimate, had, in the last two or three years, settled over 400 strikes for sums ranging from \$100 to \$10,000 each, out of which he must get his own commission. In view of the risks involved the price does not appear exorbitant. In fact, Driscoll stated that he sometimes came out a loser. With commendable pride, he said:

I want every business man with whom I have had dealings to go before the Grand Jury and tell just exactly what I did for him, what my fee was and whether or not I delivered the goods. I consider that it is absolutely legitimate to act in the capacity of labor commissioner, and that, in that capacity, I have done more good than harm in Chicago.

The functions of labor commissioners are picturesquely set forth by Driscoll in his public statements and testimony before the Grand Jury.

It was no reflection on me to transact business with a labor leader if the leader would transact.

I soon found out, after some experience with a few labor leaders, that it was necessary to do business with them if we wanted any successful results. But money spent in this way was not always spent illegitimately. We considered that we had to fight fire with fire. Sometimes when the strike leaders sent men out to slug non-union men, it became necessary to send sluggers after the sluggers.

And again, in a notorious passage which is illuminating as to the practical methods employed in "clearing the alleys" after the financial adjustments had been finally made, Driscoll explains in detail:

After the union leaders had been "fixed" we started at it. "Clearing the alleys" means putting out of business the pickets who may have had orders to prevent teamsters from driving loads to struck houses. We didn't pay any attention to these orders, because we had the wink from the union officials. I had men to see that the alleys were cleared, and if the pickets didn't obey the instructions of my "wrecking crew," they had their blocks knocked off.

The office of labor commissioner was no sinecure. On the contrary, it was full of care and of strenuousness, and Driscoll's sensitive feelings are naturally outraged that his services in that office are not more esteemed in that community, which has in the past so often negotiated peace through his agency. Quite properly outraged! He and Shea could have saved the city millions, not to mention countless broken heads and a score of murders, and all for a mere pittance, not more than \$50,000, which certain parsimonious merchants refused to pay. The consequences of this parsimony is that the whole community has been for months experiencing the convulsions of acute industrial colic, and has been paying out some \$120,000 a month for extra police and deputies.

This is the smallest item of expense. How absolutely foolish all this extravagance must seem to Shea and his fellows who only asked a little pocket money, with which to buy beer, as the price of peace.

Peace, it appears, might have been negotiated at any time by payment of a certain amount of money to those who "dealt in strikes as a commodity," and had employers chosen to buy immunity at the price set, had they acted as they were expected to act, it would have been cheaper for them. They would have been in the predicament of one who yields up his purse at the point of a pistol. Yielding up the purse encourages highway robbery, and one is morally bound to resist, and to yield up one's life. One's purse will then, of course, be taken from one, but at least the full duties of a moral hero have been done. Furthermore, there is the chance, for one hardy enough to take it, of successful resistance and of escape with one's life. It was this chance that Chicago merchants took in the recent fight.

Driscoll's policy of knocking off blocks can be demonstrated, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to be far and away cheaper and more effective than ordinary police regulation and practice. It would seem to be another instance of the failure of municipal ownership as contrasted with private enterprise. Mr. Driscoll's experience is that you won't have much trouble with a teamster, for example, if you adopt the proper police method. Sometimes it didn't cost much money to settle strikes; perhaps, \$5 a day to some one, or \$10, or, in extreme cases, \$100; money was no consideration, anyway. Ordinarily the system could be run quite well on the cheap. "Tell a teamster he will get his face smashed in, and smash it in if he don't behave, and you won't have much trouble." Mr. Albert Young, also prominent in Chicago labor circles, we are told, used, in the good old days before Shea, the Boston cabby, "butted in," to make things very easy. "All Young had to do was to go before the Teamsters' Joint Council and tell the 'bunch' what had to be done, and they did it." But Shea appears to have been something of a smasher on his own account. "His conduct," says Mr. Driscoll, "has certainly discredited him more than any other labor leader was ever discredited before."

In Mr. Driscoll's opinion, Mr. Shea is beneath contempt. Nevertheless, it should be noted that after all this discrediting, the largest and most influential teamsters' local in Chicago, the truck drivers, when on June 18 it came to elect delegates to the international convention, voted for a solid Shea delegation,⁹ as did also on the same day, the express drivers. Shea is their man, even if he hasn't Mr. Driscoll's respect.

"Four dollars and a half and supper money" was the market price paid by the teamsters for slugging non-union men.¹⁰ Another union paid by the piece;¹¹ \$15 a man slugged, \$2 spot cash in advance, and the rest on "delivery of the goods." General picketing, including the following of non-union men for assaulting, steady employment by the week, \$6 to \$10. Two weeks after the beginning of the strike evidence was presented to the Grand Jury of seventy-four cases of assault upon non-union men by union pickets. Later in the strike 150 pickets are reported to have struck

⁹ A large majority of Chicago delegates sent to the Philadelphia convention were Shea men, and contributed largely to Shea's re-election as national president of the brotherhood.

¹⁰ Charles Ward made affidavit as follows regarding one William J. Baker: "He [Baker] asked me what I was arrested for, and I told him. I then asked him what the charge was against him, and he said it was for slugging a 'fink.' I then asked him if he did it. He said: 'Yes, and if I had a little more time I would have killed the "fink."' I said to Baker: 'You are not a teamster; why did you do it?' Baker then said to me that he was hired by the teamsters' union to do it. I asked him what they paid him, and he said they paid him \$4.50 for each job of slugging and supper money besides."

¹¹ The following account of slugging is taken from the daily press:

"Confession has been made by the men implicated that they were hired by the Carriage and Wagon Workers' Union of Chicago to beat a non-union workman known to the union by the name of Carlston. The man attacked has died recently, two weeks after his injury, but his statements enabled the police to find and arrest the sluggers. These men, three in number, have confessed that they were hired by the secretary and business agent of the union to commit the assault for \$15, \$2 being paid on account before the job was done. The money was paid from a fund of \$50 voted by the union for 'educational purposes.' According to the statement of the business agent, Gilhooley, one of the sluggers, said to him on the day after the assault: 'Well, I got that fellow Carlston last night. He put up an awful fight and kicked me in the shin. The bone is splintered, and I must see a doctor about it. He fought like h—l, and we were obliged to throw the boots into him. We done him up good, and I don't think he will be able to work any more.'"

against the union, on the ground that they had not received their regular pay, and they are reported to have presented their ultimatum to the union, "no benefits, no disturbances." The state's attorney, when asked if there had been "evidence regarding the trafficking in human life—evidence of slugging and murder for pay," before the Grand Jury replied, "there is evidence of every crime on the calendar." In fact, however, many of the crimes committed were never before entered upon the calendar. We are told of a hotel which union men used as a rendezvous for men kidnaped by the "flying squadron," and "wrecking crews" working under the direct supervision of Shea and his fellows. The expense of operating these slugging committees is ordinarily charged up to the "education fund" and the committee is the "committee on education."

It should be noted that two years since the teamsters' unions and the teaming associations in Chicago experienced what was reputed to be a general reformation. At that time Mr. Driscoll himself appears to have been somewhat discredited with his associates. "Since this reform movement of 1903" writes Professor Commons on the eve of the recent strike,¹² "the teaming industry

¹² *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1905.

can be studied as an economic rather than a criminal phenomenon." Unfortunately, in the light of recent occurrences this judgment appears unwarrantably optimistic. Two interpretations of recent events may be suggested; one is that commonly given, that honest workingmen have been made the dupes of designing leaders; the other, that the teamsters' organization is criminally degenerate. The writer believes the evidence of criminal degeneracy to be conclusive. Regeneration, therefore, was not to be expected from change of leaders or breaking up of rings, such as occurred in 1903. In Chicago, the teamsters' badge is still as it has been for years, to a considerable extent an insignia of criminal association. An irresponsible organization would take possession of the public highways, and has demonstrated that it is banded together to establish and maintain its domination at any cost. Having established this domination, it has outrageously prostituted the cause of unionism, which presumes to stand for the

uplifting of workingmen. During the strike Mr. Shea "permitted" the United States government to use the streets, and he also made a few other exceptions, as for example in the case of hospital ambulances, and hearses. In these cases he even offered to supply union drivers. But who is Mr. Shea that he should issue these permits?

The display of the button and the withdrawal of the police were now the only issues on which the union still held out. A committee appointed June 20, by the Teamsters' Joint Council, in negotiation with the employers for peace, waived even the withdrawal of the police—because it was thought that the city would withdraw them anyway on account of the expense! When the committee brought back the only terms they could get from the employers, which stipulated unconditional surrender on the button and police questions, Shea denounced them roundly before the Joint Council, and thereby regained full ascendancy over the council, which he had been in a way to lose, as a result of certain discrediting disclosures before the Grand Jury. A week later on these issues the express drivers and department-store drivers voted unanimously to continue the fight. It was clearly only a question of time however, and during July and August one local after another declared the strike off unconditionally. The truck drivers yielded July 27, and the last local to act, an organization of coal teamsters, declared the strike off on August 20.

It may be observed that the condition induced in the industrial world by the operation of these men is one of acute industrial hyperæsthesia. The nervous tension and irritation under which business is carried on is clearly pathological. The emotional reaction of the union man who finds himself by some accident working in "close proximity" to a non-union man is evidence of this pathological condition, as is also the frenzied excitement which the word "scab" arouses, which develops a sort of madness or rabies, a state of mind in which murder ceases to wear the aspect of a crime. This abnormal nervous tension is a species of insidious social degeneration.

If one asks what are the probable consequences of the strike,

one is forced to admit that the industrial wrenching has been decidedly weakening. The industrial community is convalescing slowly. The fact that comparatively few of the teamsters, approximately one-seventh of those organized, were directly involved in the strike, makes it quite improbable that any far-reaching consequences should result. Non-union men will probably be gradually forced out, and the streets again taken over by the "Brotherhood," although some of the larger houses still retain in their employ a large proportion of non-union men, and the teamsters' button is conspicuously absent in certain trades. Undoubtedly the organization is temporarily weakened, and the industrial community may expect to enjoy a period of comparative peace. It is unlikely, too, that blackmail will continue to be levied in the same bold way. The teamsters appear to have "stretched the band of unionism to the breaking point." The right of the man, who does not care to affiliate with Shea's organization, to drive a wagon in the streets of Chicago is for the time being precariously established. About one-half of those who went on strike, it is estimated, have been reinstated, upon such conditions as employers have made.

Ordinarily, considerable uncertainty might be felt as to the motives actuating the men who organized such an attack upon the community. Motives are ordinarily hidden and to be inferred indirectly from the course of events; this is especially apt to be true where one is dealing with a criminal class, or group, or ring. But no uncertainty attaches to the motives of the recent strike. There has probably never been an instance where venality, brutality, and corruption have been so unblushingly admitted and condoned. It is this aspect which makes any discussion of the economic phases seem trivial. It is an extraordinary fact that every other motive, including personal revenge, business rivalry, political intrigue to stop off municipal ownership, bribery, and blackmail — every other motive except consideration of the honest and hard-working teamster, has been asserted. No one has had the hardihood to say that the welfare of the teamster, or of the garment worker, or of the public, has been at any time a serious consideration. Organization of labor into trades unions is ordi-

narily assumed to be a normal reaction upon our present industrial order. Industry must be democratized; that is conceived to be the condition of any amelioration of the wage-earner. In the light of these high motives of brotherhood and fellowship, how ghastly appears the experience of the recent strike, bearing the stamp of venality and crime! De Tocqueville long ago noted the willingness of democratic communities to endure "poverty, servitude, and barbarism" in the name of equality. The wage-earner today, at least in certain trades and in certain localities, is bearing that yoke in the name of industrial democracy. The teamsters' strike is a modern instance of the failure of that democracy. One may not infer from this that unionism is essentially bad, but only, that it is susceptible of corruption, infecting whole communities and groups of workingmen. One may admit, as De Tocqueville did, that the "democratic revolution which we are witnessing is an irresistible fact against which it would be neither desirable nor wise to struggle," but it does not follow, on *à priori* grounds, that the movement necessarily makes for higher civilization, or for the general welfare. It is all a question of character. Industrial problems, the problems, that is to say, with which unionism deals, are exceedingly perplexing and difficult, and they involve the community's welfare fundamentally. To operate in the industrial field successfully, industrial democracy must develop a high degree of integrity, and above all must develop an unerring instinct for selecting able leaders. It would be gratuitous to assume that the trade-union membership cannot provide leaders capable of filling the positions which labor organization has created; what is clear is that whether or not men of the requisite degree of integrity and capacity are to be found in trade union ranks—and the writer believes that such men are to be found there—the power of the organization has not been in the past put into their hands.

There is a curious disposition to palliate and excuse, in the name of democracy itself. "Such scenes," observes one writer, commenting upon street rioting, "hurt the reputation of a city, but Chicago herself is guiltless here. No city in America today is more essentially democratic in spirit and none has higher ideals

of municipal life." The fact of democracy may be conceded, but certainly this only makes the guilt universal and common. The guilt which in a community less democratic might attach to a few, in proportion to our democracy, attaches to ourselves severally as citizens. The teamsters' organization was a democracy of the most extreme kind, and the responsibility for all that has occurred rests, therefore, upon the members, not with the leaders who were the tools of their organizations. Personal, individual responsibility, severally and jointly assumed, is the price of democracy. What democracy achieves that is good, is, in a sense, the achievement and pride of the rank and file, and the qualities of corruption and inefficiency are their shame. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that another great labor organization has tried another experiment in democracy, and failed, finding itself too corrupt and incapable to succeed.

In their trade, the teamsters had achieved democracy. That, however, is the simplest of social achievements, whether in politics or in industry. The mob has only to assemble, and its supreme power is established. The mob rioting is democracy, after its kind; it is the democracy of the mob: given the mobbish character, and no other kind of democracy is possible. In Chicago the teamsters' democracy was one which chose corrupt men for leaders, and which has chosen to continue these men in power. Already, the process of degeneration and disintegration is in evidence. These organizations are becoming less and less competent to act. At the time of this writing the Chicago Federation of Labor has been attempting, for weeks, to conduct its election of officers, and has failed ignominiously.¹³ The teamsters' brotherhood having lost greatly in membership has hardly avoided dis-

¹³ The first attempt at election was marked by a brutal assault of armed men who broke into the hall and attacked the election officers on guard. These men were not given over to justice, but were shielded by their fellows. The second attempt at election was made under police supervision. At a subsequent meeting, "Skinny" Madden, representing the opposition, forced through a vote annulling this election, the regularly elected officers of the Federation being warned to avoid trouble by absenting themselves from this meeting—which they did. The teamsters' electioneering methods at the recent Philadelphia meeting of the brotherhood have been given sufficient notoriety.

ruption, as a result of the electioneering practices of its leaders at its recent national convention. The quality of leadership, which that organization has developed, is hopelessly incompetent; under it the organization must disintegrate.

One naturally seeks for an explanation of the cynicism and criminality which characterizes trade unionism in certain communities and trades today. To a considerable extent, it is to be accounted for in the wide dissemination of false economic doctrines. The wage-earner is taught that he and his fellows are, in some inexplicable manner, the victims of exploitation and robbery, committed in the name of that awful bogie, capitalism. Under this system it is asserted, somehow economic principles and laws miscarry. No one gets his just reward for labor. A man's earnings cease to bear any relation to his economic service. They are what he can seize upon, spoils wrested by force from an exploiting bourgeoisie. The way to advance one's economic well-being is, therefore, not by rendering economic service, but by engaging in this unholy game of exploitation. This deluding philosophy plays into the hands of unscrupulous men, and a Chicago teamsters' strike is a natural consequence.

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